Lưu trữ Cooperative Behavior - EEPSEA Partnership https://localhost/eepsea-partnership/tag/cooperative-behavior/ Economy & Environment Partnership for Southeast Asia Thu, 14 Jan 2021 09:23:53 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.2 https://localhost/eepsea-partnership/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/cropped-EEPSEA-Header-3-32x32.png Lưu trữ Cooperative Behavior - EEPSEA Partnership https://localhost/eepsea-partnership/tag/cooperative-behavior/ 32 32 Intertemporal Decisions for Oneself and for a Group and Conservation Decisions: Evidence from a Thai Coastal Village https://localhost/eepsea-partnership/intertemporal-decisions-for-oneself-and-for-a-group-and-conservation-decisions-evidence-from-a-thai-coastal-village/ Mon, 04 Jan 2021 15:01:35 +0000 https://eepseapartners.252.toppage.vn/?p=1370 By Suparee Boonmanunt, Thomas Lauer, Bettina Rockenbach, Arne Weiss Summary: This study investigates the effects of others’ time preferences on the subjects’ decisions for a group. A lab-in-the-field experiment with Thai coastal villagers was conducted to elicit time preferences. First, the participants decide for themselves and results show that on average, their choices show a [...]

Bài viết Intertemporal Decisions for Oneself and for a Group and Conservation Decisions: Evidence from a Thai Coastal Village đã xuất hiện đầu tiên vào ngày EEPSEA Partnership.

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By Suparee Boonmanunt, Thomas Lauer, Bettina Rockenbach, Arne Weiss
Summary: This study investigates the effects of others’ time preferences on the subjects’ decisions for a group. A lab-in-the-field experiment with Thai coastal villagers was conducted to elicit time preferences. First, the participants decide for themselves and results show that on average, their choices show a present bias. The participants then decide for a group that include themselves. Prior to this decision, the participants are informed about the choices that the other members made in the individual setting. Results show that the choices made for the group are significantly less present-biased. The mechanism driving this result is that the information about a more patient member is more influential than the information about a less patient member. This study also examines the relationship between intertemporal decisions and conservation. A mangrove-planting activity was organized to observe the participants’ actual contribution to a conservation activity. The number of mangrove seeds planted and the participants’ membership status in a conservation group were used as proxies for their individual conservation decisions. Results suggest that less present-biased participants contribute more to the planting activity and seem to be more likely to be members of the conservation group, although conservation decisions are unrelated to the villagers’ long-run discounting.

Bài viết Intertemporal Decisions for Oneself and for a Group and Conservation Decisions: Evidence from a Thai Coastal Village đã xuất hiện đầu tiên vào ngày EEPSEA Partnership.

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Crop-Choice Games for Analyzing Externality Problems of Rice Field Conversion into Oil Palm Plantation in North Sumatera Province, Indonesia https://localhost/eepsea-partnership/crop-choice-games-for-analyzing-externality-problems-of-rice-field-conversion-into-oil-palm-plantation-in-north-sumatera-province-indonesia/ Mon, 04 Jan 2021 13:44:18 +0000 https://eepseapartners.252.toppage.vn/?p=1318 By Eva Anggraini Summay: This study conducted a crop-choice game to understand farmers’ farming decisions on arable land use and to analyze the kind of institutions (i.e., sanctioning versus leading-by-example) that might be effective to solve the externality problems emanating from rice-field conversion into oil palm plantations. The game also aimed to determine the extent [...]

Bài viết Crop-Choice Games for Analyzing Externality Problems of Rice Field Conversion into Oil Palm Plantation in North Sumatera Province, Indonesia đã xuất hiện đầu tiên vào ngày EEPSEA Partnership.

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By Eva Anggraini
Summay: This study conducted a crop-choice game to understand farmers’ farming decisions on arable land use and to analyze the kind of institutions (i.e., sanctioning versus leading-by-example) that might be effective to solve the externality problems emanating from rice-field conversion into oil palm plantations. The game also aimed to determine the extent to which spatial dimension influences farmers’ decisions. A total of 212 observations consisting of rice and oil palm farmers in two districts in Sumatera Utara province participated in the experiment. The results showed that the baseline scenario had the highest conversion rate (2.59), followed by the leading-by-example scenario (2.39), and then by the sanctioning scenario (1.78). This result indicates that institutional mechanism is required to solve the externality problems, and that sanctioning makes a more significant influence than leading-by-example in reducing the conversion rate. However, the conversion rates of the rice plots located at the center and at the borders did not significantly differ from one another in all scenarios. To prevent further externality problems in arable land use, we suggest establishing local institutions (i.e., informal rules agreed by farmers through sanctioning mechanism) and enhancing formal rules on land use through specifying spatial planning at the village and district levels.

Bài viết Crop-Choice Games for Analyzing Externality Problems of Rice Field Conversion into Oil Palm Plantation in North Sumatera Province, Indonesia đã xuất hiện đầu tiên vào ngày EEPSEA Partnership.

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